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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
SHANE HOCHSTETLER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 890537-CA 
Priority 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from convictions of one first degree 
felony and one second degree felony in the Third District Court. 
This Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to an order 
of the Utah Supreme Court dated September 12, 1989 transferring 
the case under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4)(Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Was trial counsel effective when he waived a jury 
instruction concerning the reliability of eyewitness 
identification where there was corroborating evidence other than 
the in-court identification? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. Const. Amend. VI: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his 
defense. 
Utah Const, art. I, S 7: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with aggravated robbery, a 
first degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (Supp. 1988) 
(this section amended 1989, the amendment does not apply to this 
case); and falsely signing a financial transaction card sales 
slip, a second degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-506.1 
(Supp. 1989) (R. 6). A jury convicted defendant as charged on 
May 16, 1989 (R. 27, 28). Judge Michael R. Murphy sentenced 
defendant on June 19, 1989 to a term of five years to life for 
count one and a concurrent term of one to fifteen years for count 
two (R. 62, 63). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At 2:00 a.m. on May 21, 1988, Ola Brattegard was 
walking with his girlfriend, Marie Sorieno, on First Avenue 
between 900 and 1000 East in Salt Lake City (T. 51-2). They had 
just returned from a party and were dressed in party clothes (T. 
52-3). As they walked along, three young men asked "Where's the 
party?" (T. 53). Brattegard felt threatened and decided to turn 
back (T. 53). As they walked back toward Ms. Sorieno's home, the 
three young men, including defendant, jumped out and defendant 
said "Give me all your money or I'll kill you" (T. 54). 
Defendant pulled out a small calibre pistol with a long 
black barrel (T. 55). The three took Brattegard's tuxedo jacket 
that Ms. Sorieno had been wearing and fled (T. 56). Inside the 
jacket were Brattegard's wallet, camera, car keys, watch, two 
Visa credit cards, a telephone calling card, and a Norwegian Army 
identification card (T. 56-8). The watch was a black plastic 
Lorus brand with a digital face (T. 57, 64). The Norwegian Army 
identification card stated that Brattegard was a sergeant in the 
Norwegian Army (T. 58). 
At 10:46 a.m. on May 21, 1988f Brattegard's stolen Visa 
card was used to purchase a 14 karat gold bracelet at Spencer's 
Gifts (T. 68-71). The person using the card wrote the address 
180 P Street and signed Brattegard's name on the sales slip (T. 
70). Analysis of the handwriting showed that the same person who 
filled out the application for defendant's California driver's 
license also wrote the address on the sales slip (T. 109-12). 
At 2:30 p.m. on May 21, 1988, defendant pawned a 14 
karat yellow gold bracelet and a black Lorus watch at Main Street 
Pawn (T. 76-8, 133). He presented his California driver's 
license with photograph as identification and left his index 
fingerprint on the pawn card (T. 77-9, 106-07, 133, 136). He 
received $20 for these items (T. 80, 144). 
Sometime during the last of May, 1988, defendant told 
Misty Mortensen that he and some other people had robbed a 
Norwegian Army sergeant using a gun (T. 83-5, 88, 93). She knew 
defendant through other friends and believed he had access to a 
gun (T. 84). Misty lived at 180 P Street and defendant had been 
to her house (T. 82-3). 
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In June, 1988 defendant and two others told Heather 
Smith that they had robbed a Norwegian Army sergeant (T. 96). 
They showed her some of the things they had taken (T. 97). One 
of the others called her, using a stolen telephone calling card 
(T. 97). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The circumstances of this case did not require that the 
jury be instructed about the reliability of eyewitness 
identification because there was other evidence corroborating 
defendant's guilt. The eyewitness identification was not the 
lynchpin of the State's case, although it was part of the 
evidence upon which the State relied for conviction. Because an 
eyewitness identification instruction was not required, counsel 
was effective even though he affirmatively waived the 
instruction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TRIAL COUNSEL WAS EFFECTIVE EVEN THOUGH HE 
AFFIRMATIVELY WAIVED AN EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION INSTRUCTION BECAUSE THE 
INSTRUCTION WAS NOT REQUIRED. 
In State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), the Utah 
Supreme Court instructed that from then on, a defendant is 
entitled to an instruction cautioning jurors about possible flaws 
in eyewitness identifications where eyewitness identification is 
a central issue and an instruction is requested by defense 
counsel, ^d. at 490; see also State v. Stilling, 770 P.2d 137 
(Utah 1989). The Court expressed concern that defendants not be 
single witness as the lynchpin of the State's case without the 
jury being cautioned about the possible frailties of human 
perception and recall. Long, 721 P.2d at 487, 488, 490. The 
Court's ruling was not based upon constitutional principles but 
upon the Court's supervisory capacity over the lower courts. 
Stilling, 770 P.2d at 143. 
Based upon Long, the defendant in this case contends 
that his attorney was ineffective because he affirmatively waived 
the giving of a cautionary instruction. He asserts that the 
trial court would have been required to give the instruction had 
it been requested and that, therefore, counsel was ineffective by 
waiving the instruction. Defendant's assertion that the 
instruction was required is incorrect and his claim of 
ineffectiveness based upon the assertion should fail. 
In evaluating an ineffective counsel claim, this Court 
must determine both that counsel rendered a deficient performance 
that fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional 
judgment and that defendant was prejudiced by the performance 
before it may reverse defendant's conviction. State v. Gardner, 
P.2d , 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 12 (1989); State v. Carter, 
776 P.2d 886, 893 (Utah 1989). Defendant must overcome a strong 
presumption that counsel was adequate. State v. Bullock, 
P.2d , 119 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, 36 (1989); State v. Moritzsky, 
771 P.2d 688, 690 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Failure to request a 
pertinent jury instruction could be deficient performance "where 
evidentiary support for the instruction was compelling." 
Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1113 (Utah 1983)(failure to 
request instruction on lesser included offense not supported by 
evidence not ineffective). 
In this case, counsel's performance was not deficient 
because eyewitness identification was not a central issue in this 
case and the evidentiary support for the instruction was, 
therefore, not compelling. Under the Long standard, the trial 
court was not required to give the instruction even though it 
might have given the instruction if counsel had requested. It is 
not at all clear that Judge Murphy thought an instruction was 
needed. Judge Murphy merely asked counsel if an instruction was 
needed and even indicated that he did not think that eyewitness 
identification was sufficiently prominent to require a cautionary 
instruction (T. 154). 
The identification of defendant as the person who 
robbed Ola Brattegard occurred at trial. There was no evidence 
of prior identifications through lineups, showups or photo 
lineups offered. The record discloses that, other than the day 
of trial (and on the night of the robbery), Brattegard had seen 
defendant at the preliminary hearing (T. 139). There is no 
allegation of suggestiveness that would make the allegation of a 
need for an eyewitness cautionary instruction more compelling nor 
are there any other circumstances requiring it. 
Unlike Long, defendant was convicted based upon other 
corroborating evidence. This evidence included that, later on 
the day of the robbery, defendant purchased a gold bracelet using 
the victim's stolen credit card (T. 70-71). Although the sales 
clerk did not identify defendant as the purchaser of the 
bracelet, a handwriting expert determined that defendant wrote 
the address "180 P Street, Salt Lake Utah 84109" on the sales 
slip after comparing the writing with a sample of defendant's 
writing (T. 109-12)• A few hours after the gold bracelet was 
purchased, defendant pawned a black Lorus wristwatch, like the 
one stolen from the victim, and a gold bracelet, like the one 
purchased earlier, for $20 (T. 76-8, 80, 133, 144). Around the 
time of the robbery, defendant and some other individuals bragged 
to two young women that they had robbed a Norwegian Army sergeant 
(T. 83-5, 88, 93, 96). One of these young women lived at the 180 
P Street address written by defendant on the credit card sales 
slip (T. 82). She testified that defendant had been to her home 
and defendant testified that he was there on the night of the 
robbery (T. 139-40) . 
At trial, defendant told inconsistent stories about the 
bracelet and the watch that he pawned. When asked what he 
pawned, defendant replied, "My gold bracelet and a watch." (T. 
133) (emphasis added). Then he said: 
I don't recall where I got the watch. I 
think I got — I got the bracelet from Jay, 
and I believe the watch from Eric. 
. . . 
About an hour before we hocked it. 
(T. 134). Then, when asked whether he had ever seen the watch or 
the bracelet before that day, defendant responded: 
A No, I hadn't. 
Q Where as — you say you got the watch from 
David? 
A No. I really can't remember where I got 
that from. I had that for a couple of days 
before that. 
(T. 134). Later, defendant insisted that he obtained the watch 
on the same day he pawned it and had never seen it before. He 
denied having said anything different just moments earlier (T. 
146). This inconsistent testimony was evidence from which the 
jury could infer that defendant was lying about his claimed 
innocence of the crimes charged. 
The corroborating evidence decreased the importance of 
the eyewitness identification to the point that the 
identification was not the central issue of the case. This case 
is strikingly similar to those pre-Long cases in which the Utah 
Supreme Court found that failure to give a cautionary instruction 
was not an abuse of discretion. Compare State v. Stilling, 770 
P.2d 137, 143-44 (Utah 1989) (case did not require cautionary 
instruction as it was more like cases where court had found no 
abuse of discretion due to other corroborating evidence than like 
those where court had found abuse of discretion). Because the 
identification of defendant by Brattegard was not the central 
issue, and because there was other corroborating evidence, a jury 
instruction was not required under Long and counsel's waiver of 
the instruction was not deficient performance. 
Defendant urges this Court to reverse his conviction 
notwithstanding the corroborating evidence because he claims that 
the corroborating evidence was weak. These claims of weakness 
are based on defendant's own testimony denying involvement in the 
crimes and alleging that other witnesses lied. The jury was not 
obligated to believe his self-serving testimony, State v. Howell, 
649 P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 1982), and the existence of his claims do 
not convert eyewitness identification into a central issue in 
this case. His arguments in this regard invite the Court to 
shift its focus from whether eyewitness identification was 
central to whether the jury ought to have relied upon the 
corroborating evidence. This Court should decline the 
invitation. 
Even if this Court determined that an instruction was 
required because the eyewitness identification was a central 
issue, it could determine that defendant was not prejudiced by 
the failure to give the instruction and affirm the conviction. 
To find that defendant was prejudiced by the lack of a cautionary 
instruction, this Court must find that there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a different result if the jury had been instructed. 
State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401 (Utah 1986). That is, that this 
Court's confidence in the verdict is undermined. State v. 
Morehouse, 748 P.2d 217, 219 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The 
corroborating evidence described above was sufficient to support 
defendant's conviction even if the identification was weak and 
there is no reasonable likelihood of a different result if the 
instruction had been given. 
Finally, even if counsel was ineffective for failing to 
request the cautionary instruction, this ineffectiveness applies 
only to the aggravated robbery charge. The eyewitness testimony 
was relevant only to that charge and there was other evidence 
from which the jury convicted defendant of falsely signing a 
financial transaction card sales slip. If this Court finds 
reversible error, it should reverse only the conviction the error 
affected and affirm the conviction on count tv/o. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to affirm defendant's conviction of both counts. If this Court 
finds reversible error on the instructions relating to count one, 
the State requests the Court to affirm count two. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this _/0 day of January, 
1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
^ 4 
SANDRA L. SJOGREN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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